

BRITISH OPINION AND THE LAUSANNE PEACE CONFERENCE AND TREATY

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INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to examine the British newspapers' and periodicals' views, report and comments on the Lausanne Conference and Treaty. It is not a study of British policy towards the Lausanne Conference, nor a study of official British views of the Lausanne Conference. Also it is not the present purpose to study the attitude of the British press towards Turkey for its own sake, but rather, to approach press attitudes and coverage as indicators of British public opinion.

The early years of the Kemalist regime were marked by acute tension in Anglo-Turkish relations, a circumstance which was duly reflected in the tone of British press comment on the subject of the "New Turkey". Following the end of the First World War, the British government of Lloyd George had taken the lead in persuading its allies to impose harsh peace terms upon the defeated Ottoman Empire. These terms, embodied in the 1920 Treaty of Sévres, envisaged a rump Turkish state in İstanbul and Asia Minor, to be ruled as before by the Ottoman Sultan, but to be subject to a range of financial and military controls by the Great Powers, leaving its independence and sovereignty scarcely more than nominal. In addition, Greece was granted permanent possession of Eastern Thrace, together with the provisional administration of the İzmir region of Asia Minor, while it was also proposed to create an Armenian state in eastern Asia Minor. The British likewise took the lead in seeking to enforce the Treaty of Sévres against the opposition of the nascent Turkish national movement, which, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, had formed its own government at Ankara, in the heart of Asia Minor. In particular, the British encouraged the Greeks to advance from their base at İzmir to attack the nationalists. This policy failed. Mustafa Kemal's forces rapidly extinguished the fledgling Armenian state in October 1920, halted the Greek advance at Sakarya in September 1921, and in August 1922 launched a successful offensive which drove all Greek forces from Asia Minor and brought Britain herself to the brink of war. In the event, the British backed down, agreeing at the Mudanya armistice in October 1922 to Mustafa Kemal's demand for the restoration of Eastern Thrace, and conceding that the Treaty of Sévres should be subject to fundamental revision at an international conference, to be held in Lausanne.

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE AND TREATY

The conference to revise the discredited Treaty of Sèvres opened at Lausanne on November 20, 1922. It was attended by representatives of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Turkey; the U.S.A. sent an observer. The Conference established three Commissions, for the purpose of discussing the several groups of questions on its agenda. The first Commission, responsible for territorial and military questions, was under the presidency of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, and dealt with the issues of the boundary of Eastern Thrace, Turkey's rights at the Straits, and the future of Western Thrace and Mosul, two regions claimed by the National Pact, but as yet outside Turkey's control. The second Commission, charged with examining the interests of foreigners in Turkey, and also with the protection of minorities, was presided over by the Marquis Garroni, the representative of Italy. The third Commission, responsible for financial and economic questions, was presided over by M.Barrère, the representative of France. From the start, the Turkish delegation, headed by General İsmet Pasha, insisted on the full implementation of the National Pact, with its demands for full and unfettered Turkish sovereignty in all domestic matters. Difficulties quickly arose over the issues of non-Turkish minorities in Turkey, over Mosul, and over the Capitulations the legal, fiscal and commercial privileges enjoyed by the subjects of European Powers in the Ottoman Empire.

While broadly anxious for peace with the new Turkey, the British press foresaw difficult negotiations ahead, and expressed some nervousness at the militantly nationalist mood of the Ankara government. The New Statesman described Turkey's position as: "a Sword in one hand and an olive branch in the other", while the Times, in a leading article, stated that "a new Turkey had appeared: a Turkey that took far less account of Islam than of a revived Turkish racial spirit", and warned that if the Turks wanted to return to Europe, they must be more closely associated with the nations of Europe, and should recognise the European principle of the protection of national minorities². Like the other conservative newspapers, the Times was fearful of Bolshevik influence upon the Turkish leaders, and thought the Bolsheviks stood behind them: Turkey had been a pawn in German strategy during the First World War, but this time she was serving as an instrument in the hands of those implacable enemies of the British Empire, the Bolsheviks³.

2 Times, December 13, 1922, p.11; the Near East similarly stated that the Ankara authorities were ignorant of western standard of administration. See January 11, 1923.

3 The Times, believed there was not much doubt that Bolshevik propaganda had affected a considerable number of Turks, both of the educated and of the lower class. October 14, 1922, p.11; October 7, 1922, p.11; the Daily Express had the same idea, see January 9, 1923, p.7; the Sunday Referee stated the Turks were not entirely free agents, and the Ankara Government was so tough because of Russia. January 28, 1923, p.7.

These early apprehensions were reinforced by the actual course of the Lausanne negotiations. By January 1923, the conference was deadlocked. The Turkish representatives insisted on their National Pact, and the Allies refused the Turkish demands categorically. The outstanding questions were the treatment of minorities, the Capitulations, the freedom of the Straits, the disposal of Western Thrace, and Mosul. The uncompromising attitude was not only on the Turkish side; the French delegation insisted upon the Capitulations, and upon full repayment of Turkey's foreign debts. Lord Curzon warned the Turkish delegation sternly that if they did not do as he told them he would go right home, or otherwise punish them. The Turks courteously replied that they were sorry, but they could not agree.

The Times was not sure whether the Turks had come to Lausanne to make peace or to continue their struggle for complete independence, and it found the Turkish policy of "wait and see" at Lausanne boring⁴. The New Statesman likewise complained of Turkish demands which were not merely technical breaches of the Mudanya Agreement: the denunciation of the Capitulations, the closing of the Mixed Courts, and of foreign Post Offices, the raising of the customs tariff to an incredible figure, and attacks upon foreign schools in İstanbul were unacceptable. The New Statesman stated that it had supported and defended the Turks consistently when they fought for genuine national aims against the injustice of the Treaty of Sévres, and against the aggression of the armies of Greece, but warned that it could not defend the Turks when they turned round upon the very principles which had given them moral support in Europe. The New Statesman described the Ankara policy as "drunken nationalism", and "almost suicidal in character". It believed that the Turks would maintain their preposterous attitude: "They have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by exercising patience for a few days. They have not the slightest reason to fear any trick being played them by the Allies; they can still hope to profit by divergences of interest and differences of opinion round the table of a Peace Conference. But they can expect nothing but disaster by provoking a conflict with the united arms of the three Great Powers. Let Kemal drunk appeal to Kemal sober"⁵.

The Daily Telegraph's İstanbul correspondent reported in January 1923 that⁶ "the Turks mean to fight"; similarly, a leading article in the Morning Post found Ankara's policy bellicose, and warned that many members of the Ankara Assembly had been blinded by the dazzling treasures of the Bolsheviks. The Morning Post feared that Mustafa Kemal was looking to the East, and not to the West, to Moscow, not to London. The article asserted that

4 Times, January 4, 1923, p.11.

5 New Statesman, November 11, 1922, p.165.

6 Daily Telegraph, January 10, 1923, p.12.

the policy of Ankara was the same as the policy of Abdulhamid at Istanbul, of Lenin in Moscow, and of Dr. Cuno in Berlin: the policy of playing off one ally against the other⁷. This last judgement was echoed by the Daily Express, which suggested that Turkey was trying to play off the powers one against the other, and that the Turks did not understand modern diplomacy: they were acting as though in an Oriental Bazaar.⁸

The Manchester Guardian also found the Turkish government bellicose and ready to fight⁹. On the other hand, a few papers, notably the Daily Herald, and also some Sunday papers, took a different view. The Daily Herald emphasized the war danger, and criticized the British stance at Lausanne¹⁰ blaming "...all this trouble and expense on the part of our imperialists...", whose real interest was Mosul's rich oil resources¹¹. The Sunday Pictorial was also critical of the Government's policy, particularly over Mosul. In January 1923 it printed an article by Lovat Fraser¹² entitled Why Should We Hurt Lancashire For The Sake Of Mosul?"¹³ which argued that while the world was looking anxiously at the Ruhr Valley, England was slowly and stupidly drifting towards war in Mesopotamia. Fraser continued: "...we have a couple of million people out of work in this Island, though not all of them are registered. When our own countrymen are in such distress why fight about Mosul?"¹⁴. The Sunday Pictorial's leading article stated that:

"...the whole nation wants to see us out of Mesopotamia, with our troops back at home, and our armoured cars and aeroplanes set to more useful purposes"

7 Morning Post, January 31, 1923, p.6.

8 Daily Express, January 9, 1923, p.7; February 2, 1923, p.6; the Daily Telegraph reported "Down to the last moment it thought that the parallel to bazaar bargaining which the conference has shown would end as bazaar haggles mostly do in the Turks accepting less than he demanded, but far more than he expected to get". February 6, 1923, p.10.

9 The Manchester Guardian, criticized the Turkish demand for Mosul, and stated "Mosul Turkish! They are probably more Turks in Manchester". January 6, 1923; January 10, 11, 15, 17, 24, 1923; in the middle of February the Manchester Guardian changed its mind, and thought Turkey did not intend to fight. February 13, 1923, p.6.

10 According to the Daily Herald British Foreign Policy was not bringing a settlement, the real possibility of a new war. January 2, 1923, p.1

11 Daily Herald, January 3, 1923, p.4

12 Lovat Fraser; born 1871; chief literary adviser and contributor, Sunday Pictorial and Daily Mirror; Editorial staff of Times, 1907-1922; editor of The Times of India for several years; went on various special missions for The Times (London) to India, China, and the Dominions, and round the World; travelled extensively in many parts of the World, notably the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, the China Seas, Manchuria, Siberia, Egypt, Japan and most European countries. Publications: "At Delhi", 1903; "India Under Curzon and After", 1912; wrote several articles in favour of peace with Turkey in Sunday Pictorial during the Lausanne Peace Negotiations. Who Was Who vol.II, 1916-1928, p.379.

13 Sunday Pictorial, January 28, 1923, p.6.

14 Sunday Pictorial, February 18, 1923, p.6..

Lovat Fraser questioned Lord Curzon's achievement at Lausanne: "Has the accomplished leader of the British House of Lords, the scholarly chancellor of Oxford University, any real reason to be proud of his victory in dialectics over a poor little deaf and unlettered Turkish general?"¹⁵

Similar view were expressed in the Weekly Dispatch, which, with the Sunday Pictorial, urged several times "Make Peace With Turkey": "why are we protecting Baghdad and leaving the heart of the Empire unprotected? why are we squandering millions abroad to no good and while we cannot afford to protect our own homes and our own flesh and blood?" The Weekly Dispatch's leading article urged a return to the traditional British policy of friendly relations with Turkey, which was essential to the interests of British Empire. It added that all sensible and educated Turks realised that it would be impossible for Turkey to fight with the Allies¹⁶. The popular press warned that Bonar Law's government was paying for Lloyd George's sins and for his mistaken policy towards the Middle East.

The New Statesman tried to explain Turkish behaviour as a manifestation of "triumphant nationalism", which was extremely touchy about any foreign intervention and determined to exercise its own rights in its own way¹⁷. In the New Statesman's view, the Capitulations would have to go, or at any rate, be drastically revised, "if the Angora fanatics who demand 'Turkey for the Turks' determine presently to damage their country by making it too uncomfortable for foreigners"¹⁸. Although the New Statesman argued that Lord Curzon's treatment of the Turks was one cause of the deadlock at Lausanne, it believed that the chief obstacles to a settlement were Ankara, and its representatives' extravagant claims. As to the thorny issue of Mosul, the New Statesman criticized the idea that "there is the oil", and that Britain should stay in Iraq at any cost for the sake of oil. It believed that what kept Britain in Mosul was the fact that Britain was solemnly bound to the protection of Iraq by her mandate from the League of Nation.¹⁹ Another weekly, the Nation and Athenaeum, disagreed, and like the Conservative

¹⁵ General Ismet Pasha was the chief Turkish negotiator at Lausanne and a close friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

¹⁶ The Weekly Dispatch believed the Turks to be in favour of peace except for a few fanatics, January 11, 1923, p.8; March 11, 1923, p.8; March 23, 1923, p.8; April 22, 1923, p.8.

¹⁷ New Statesman, December 30, 1922, p.373; the New Statesman discerned the influence of Moscow over the Turkish leaders, but it argued: "The Russians are not the natural brothers in arms, and in diplomacy of the Turks..."

¹⁸ New Statesman, December 2, 1922, p.257.

¹⁹ New Statesman, February 3, 1923, p.506-507.

papers, accused Turkey of bluffing, and of playing off one great power against another²⁰ Similar opinions were expressed in the Near East²¹.

In sum, at the beginning of 1923 almost every British paper and periodical was inclined to take a hostile view of Turkey: the new Turkey was the same as the old one, and the new leader's policy the same as Abdulhamid's; the Turks were under Russian tutelage, and not able to make an agreement with Great Britain or other powers without Russia's knowledge. All in all the Turks remained a destructive, rather than a constructive, force in the world²²

The deadlock at Lausanne proved insuperable, however, and at the beginning of February 1923 the negotiations were formally suspended. In Britain, this provoked much anxious comment. The Times, in a leading article, expressed²³ the view that the Turks had come to Lausanne to exploit the differences between Great Britain, France, and Italy, for they had ample experience both of the miscalculations and of the dissensions of the Western Powers. The article noted, however, that it was not with these Powers that the Turks had to make peace. "They are [the Turks] called upon to make their peace with the civilization that may, if they are willing, include them within the sweep of its own strong impulse of progress". The article believed that the offer which had been made at Lausanne was an unexampled and astonishing opportunity for the Turks. "The alternative to the acceptance of

20 According to the Nation And Athenaeum "in negotiations between East and West it is never wise to take too tragic a view of a situations which goes on interminably becoming blacker and blacker, and one must never forget the infinite possibilities in policy of bluff". January 6, 1923 p.536; the Nation and Athenaeum criticized Turkey for fishing in the troubled waters between Russia and Britain, Britain and France. See November 18, 1922, p.275; February 10, 1923, p.710.

21 Near East, April 6, July 6, 1922.

22 Sir (Ignatius) Valentine Chirol, wrote an article entitled "Islam And Britain" in which he stated; "Turks have contributed nothing of their own to human progress nothing to science or art or literature but what they borrowed from Persia and Arabs..." Foreign Affairs, vol.1, no.3, March 15, 1923, p.48; during the break down of the Lausanne Negotiations Mr.Chirol wrote a letter to the Editor of the Times in which he continued same idea "...it is vain for Western civilization to seek any real modus vivendi with the Turk..." February 6, 1923, p.11. Sir (Ignatius) Valentine Chirol, (1852-1929); traveller, journalist, and author; educated mainly in France and Germany; graduated at the Sorbonne; served four years (1872-1876), as a Clerk in the Foreign Office; spent sixteen years from 1876 to 1892, in travel, mostly in the Near East; travelled much in the Turkish Empire; served a short apprenticeship to journalism at Istanbul in 1880 on the Levant Herald; acted several times during his travels as on occasional correspondent, chiefly for the London standard; correspondent in Berlin of the Times; worked at the foreign department of the Times in London; in 1908 an original member of the board of The Times Publishing Company; in the Summer of 1915, undertook a mission for the Foreign Office to the Balkan States on behalf of Allies; present in Paris in 1919, during part of the peace negotiations. Publications: "Twixt Greek and Turk", 1881; "The Far Eastern Question" 1896; "The Middle Eastern Question", 1903; "The Egyptian Problem", 1920; "The Occident and the Orient", 1924. Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, p.182-183.

23 Times, February 3, 1923, p.11.

this treaty is a return to exhausting conflict, and the sacrifice of the hope of independence to the inexorable demands of Bolshevism". In another leading article, the Times commented that Great Britain had shown her eagerness for a settlement, but the Turks had misjudged opinion in Britain²⁴ Interestingly, the Times, the Manchester Guardian, and the Westminster Gazette all opined that the only conceivable explanation of the failure of the Lausanne conference was that Mustafa Kemal and his associates were not masters in their own house: "their judgment is overborne by the ignorant and fanatical peasants they have gathered around them; and it is these men, and not the nominal rulers of Turkey, who have dictated the inept decision at Lausanne".²⁵

The Morning Post questioned the new Turkish leaders' policy. On the one hand, the Turks insisted on their sovereignty, and did not want to make any concession to the West. But at the same time, they wanted to modernise their country and were seeking Western aid. The Turks wanted a new jurisprudence and judicial system, and the new Turks had promised the West a different dispensation from that of the old. But in demanding certain guarantees, the Morning Post continued, the Allies were not casting any reflection on the good faith of the new Turkish Regime. The Morning Post gave the example of the Bolsheviks, with whom Lloyd George had made a trade agreement, and noted that capitalists were still risking their gold in Bolshevik Russia. It warned the Allied capitalist that without certain conditions trade was unsafe with Turkey²⁶. The Morning Post found the new Turks exceedingly sensitive regarding any infringement of Turkey's sovereignty, and any foreign influence in Turkey²⁷, and warned that the fact was that if Turkey made her choice on the Western side, then she must accept certain consequences; the West would not or could not trade with the East unless it had a certain minimum guarantee that its own ideas of law and justice would for this purpose be accepted by the East²⁸. However, the Morning

²⁴ Times, February 5, 1923, p.11.

²⁵ Times, February 6, 1923, p.11; the Manchester Guardian, noted that inside the Grand National Assembly there existed a Peace Party and War Party, a Moderate Party and an Extremist Party, February 28, 1923; the Westminster Gazette thought Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Pasha and Constantinople Turks were aware of the danger of military adventure, February 3, 1923, p.3; the Spectator believed that Turkey was in favour of peace. February 17, 1923.

²⁶ Morning Post, February 7, 1923, p.6.

²⁷ Morning Post, February 6, 1923, p.9; the Turkish Negotiating Team was found ignorant of the mysteries of finance, and extremely chauvinistic and nationalist by the Westminster Gazette.

²⁸ Morning Post, February 6, 1923, p.9; February 7, 1923, p.6; the Nation and Athenaeum pointed out that after the Lausanne Conference broke down: "the ordinary man is left wondering whether after all he will really have to fight in the Near East a war to decide whether European judges shall sit in Turkish courts and what guarantees shall be given to the holders of Turkish bonds". February 10, 1923, p.710.

Post was by now more reassured about Turkey's relations with Russia, and doubted whether they were cordial, or would really succeed. But the Morning Post repeated that Turkish reconstruction was impossible without foreign help, and while it was confident that the new leaders of Turkey knew the reality, and did not trust the Bolsheviks and the Germans²⁹, almost in the same breath, it accused the Turks of copying the methods of the Bolsheviks³⁰.

In a series of articles³¹ in the Westminster Gazette, mostly devoted to Turkey's economic prospects, J.A.Spender³² likewise doubted the effectiveness of Bolshevik pressure on Turkey³³ "...in all the world there are no two human beings more unlike in their respective outlooks on life, government, and religion than the Turkish Mohammedan and the Russian Bolshevik."

Immediately before the rupture of negotiations at Lausanne, the Daily Telegraph had recommended that³⁴ the British Delegation to be generous to Turkey, and put her on her feet again. It was especially concerned at the possibility of a Turkish attack on the British forces in Istanbul and at the Straits. Even after the rupture, the Daily Telegraph remained moderate in its attitude, arguing that the economic policy envisaged by Mustafa Kemal would be acceptable, for it was the same as the western economic model, not the Russian³⁵. At the same time, like the rest of the conservative press,

29 Morning Post, February 5, 1923, p.6; the Morning Post was not sure about the intentions of Mustafa Kemal, February 5, 1923, p.9.

30 Morning Post, February 6, 1923, p.9.

31 Westminster Gazette, February 5, 1923, p.3; the Quarterly Review, stated that Turkey could get help only from Western Powers not from bankrupt Russia, see "Turkey and the Powers", vol.239, no.474, January 1923, p.182

32 John Alfred Spender, (1862-1942); Journalist and author; educated at Bath College; in 1881 won an exhibition at Balliol College Oxford; editor of the Morning News in 1886; assistant editor of the Pall Mall, and Pall Mall changed its owner and its policies which were liberal; resigned in 1893 and the other staff of the Pall Mall appeared under Cook, and the old staff the first issue of the Westminster Gazette; editor of the Westminster Gazette 1896 to 1916; was the front-page leader; preached a robust and reasoned Liberalism which sometimes left impetuous radicals impatient but won high and constant commendation. When the split between Asquith and Lloyd George occurred, supported Asquith without reserve, retained the position until February 1922; regularly contributed special articles to the New Westminster, but in 1928 the paper finished a short and inglorious career. Publications: "Official Biography both of Campbell Bannerman, (2 vols, 1923); "With Cyril Asquith (later Lord Asquith of Bishopstone) of Lord Oxford and Asquith, (2 vols, 1932); "The Public Life" (2 vol.1925); "Life, Journalism and Politics" (2 vol.1927); "Fifty Years of Europe" (1933); "The Government of Mankind" (1938); "The Changing East" (1926). Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-1950, p.812-814. See further information, Wilson Harris, J.A.Spender: Private Information: Personal Knowledge, London 1946.

33 Westminster Gazette, February 3, 1923, p.3.

34 Daily Telegraph, February 2, 1923, p.8; February 3, 1923, p.9.

35 The Daily Telegraph, noted that the Izmir Economic Conference, which opened after the Lausanne negotiations had been broken off, had proposed the Western Economic Model, not the Bolsheviks Economic Model. February 19, 1923; February 6, 1923, p.9.

the Daily Telegraph continued to criticize the pro-Bolshevik policy of Ankara; it also noted that since the separation of the functions of the Caliphate from those of the Sultanate, Ankara was no longer the uncriticized leader of Islam, and that the new Turks had lost a weapon which they had used against Great Britain in the past.

The Sunday Pictorial continued to press for peace with Turkey. On February 11, 1923 ³⁶, Lovat Fraser wrote an article in which stated that he believed that the Turks wanted peace at Lausanne, but that they were slow in deciding. On the other hand he complained of the treatment of the Turkish delegates at Lausanne, which he compared to "treating naughty school boys". A. Hulme Beaman³⁷ questioned Lord Curzon's statement that "England would go to war rather than yield one inch", noting that "it is dubious if the British citizen would have any pleasure in fighting over Mosul in order to give it to the alien Bedouin chief from the Hedjaz whom England has imposed upon Irak". Similarly, an article in the Nineteenth Century and After, entitled "Turkey"³⁸, criticized the treatment of Turkey, and accused the British delegates of failing to recognise the Turks as nation of at least the same calibre as Portugal or Paraguay; the trouble was that the British delegates had in mind the old idea of the "sick man of Europe". The Saturday Review drew attention to the danger to the Middle East and pointed out that the Allies had to take into account something new and strange, yet portentous, in the Nationalism of Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara Assembly, the 'basis and spirit of which were really formidable'³⁹.

Following the suspension of the Lausanne negotiations on 4 February 1923, the British press was almost unanimous that Turkish obduracy was to blame. Some papers attributed this to Bolshevik pressure; others placed the responsibility on extremists in the Ankara Assembly. New Witness⁴⁰ saw

³⁶ Sunday Pictorial, February 11, 1923, p.6; Mr. Fraser continued his protest against War with Turkey and wrote "why should we want to fight the Turks again?" and "where is Mosul, and what has it to do with us?" also he was concerned about India's Moslems if the war became with Turkey. February 18, 1923, p.6.

³⁷ Beaman asked "Will history repeat itself once more? We are now straining at gnats and swallowing camels. Does the British soldier, sailor, and taxpayer understand whither he is being led? He would do well to ask himself the question before it is too late". See Nineteenth Century and After, March 1923, vol.93, p.324-325,327.

³⁸ Raylan, "Turkey", Nineteenth Century and After, vol.194, November 1923, p.686-688.

³⁹ Saturday Review, February 3, 1923, p.140.

⁴⁰ New Witness had different point of view: "...Now we have great sympathy with those who protest, both from the traditionally Liberal and from the traditionally christian point of view, against the presence of the Turk in Europe. We think that during the long quarrel between Islam and Christendom in Eastern Europe, and especially in the later phases of it, the Moslem has been a bad and barren ruler and often no more than robber..." vol.XXXI, no.535, February 9, 1923, p.81-82; vol.XXI, no.538, February 16, 1923, p.97-98.

the Turks' intractability as being "in the nature of a veritable Revolt of Islam...". The Economist was prepared to concede that Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha were moderate and genuine Turkish nationalists, but it warned that a nationalist outlook brought some disadvantages, pointing to the Turks' insistence upon their extreme national programme⁴¹ concerning finance and the rectification of frontiers. The Economist believed, however, that if these issues could be settled, there was no reason why nationalist Turkey should not live peacefully in the same world with the British Empire⁴². The Daily Telegraph noted that Turkish soldiers distrusted and disliked Bolshevism, and the subservience to Moscow of the political extremists, and that some of the Turkish military leaders, although they might not love the British Empire, had a wholesome respect for it. But the Daily Telegraph believed that the real "peace Party" could be found among the more enlightened and sober members of the older generation of Young Turks⁴³.

Others attributed the Turks' intractability to their bargaining tactics. The Times's special correspondent in Ankara complained of: "dealing with an Asiatic people who do not understand the rules of western diplomacy, and who regard each fresh concession as a sign of weakness, instead of fair give-and-take"⁴⁴. The Spectator accused Mustafa Kemal of deliberately giving rein to his extremists in order to impress the Allies ⁴⁵, while the Nation and Athenaeum suggested that the Turks had been playing their traditional policy at the conference, at first fishing successfully in the troubled waters between Russia and Britain, and then fishing in the troubled waters between Britain and France⁴⁶. The Spectator was not sure whether Mustafa Kemal's government was genuinely working for the salvation of the Turkish race, or whether it was a group of adventurers bent on exploiting 'international chaos to their own advantage'⁴⁷. The Daily Mail stated that the Turks regarded themselves as a victorious and much injured race: "they have almost forgotten Lord Allenby's march through Syria, but they remember very vividly how they armed themselves and flung the Greeks into the Sea"⁴⁸.

41 Westminster Gazette mentioned the same point: "Every national movement, more particularly if it should meet with a measure of military success, makes inflated claims. The type of mind which can organise, discipline, and direct such movements to victory is not blessed with a superabundance of reason, and it is very difficult to exorcise the war spirit and jettison the leading which have justified themselves on the field of battle". March 1, 1923, p.6.

42 Economist, March 3, 1923, p.486.

43 Daily Telegraph, January 27, 1923, p.10.

44 Times, March 20, 1923, p.11.

45 Spectator, March 24, 1923, p.1.

46 Nation and Athenaeum, February 10, 1923, p.711; the Nation and Athenaeum did not believe that there should be war over the Capitulations and the security of the Turkish bondholders.

47 Spectator, February 17, 1923, p.274..

48 The Daily Mail, quoted Lord Morley "...get into the skins of the Turks if we want to restore peace in the East." March 22, 1923, p.8.

Only the New Statesman took the view that the British side might be responsible for the breaking up the Lausanne negotiations. In first place, it believed that Turkey was not determined to make Britain the arch-enemy, secondly, it thought Britain was playing the price for a long course of tricky intrigues and broken promises given during the First World War and its aftermath. It argued that it was Lord Curzon's treatment of the Turks which was the prime cause of the deadlock, describing Curzon as "the champion of the disastrous policy". However, the New Statesman agreed that the Turks were making extravagant claims, because their insensate nationalism drove them to cut off their nose to spite their face⁴⁹.

In February 1923, the Daily Mail sent a correspondent, G.Ward Price⁵⁰, to Turkey. In Ankara, Ward Price interviewed Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and also Rauf Bey⁵¹, the prime minister. Ward Price judged that the Turks wanted to live in peace on good terms with Britain, and with the Allies. He found Rauf Bey understanding of the Allies' point of view, and professing strong sympathies for Britain. Ward Price assured him there was a strong and sincere desire in Britain to see Turkey fully independent, but Rauf Bey replied:

"When I had signed it [the Moudros armistice], I told Admiral Calthorpe that I had done so because I trusted the good faith of the British nation. He was much moved, shook me by the hand, and then, turning to his officers, he said: 'It is true, isn't it gentlemen, that England always, keeps her word?'. As one man they answered 'yes'. Yet it was only a few months later that the armistice of Moudros was broken under the protection of the very guns of Admiral Calthorpe's flagship by the landing of Greeks at Smyrna".

As to the financial disputes at Lausanne, Rauf Bey commented:

"We see the Allies trying to keep their foot inside our door, and continue their financial tutelage of Turkey, after making a pretence of leaving the house entirely..."

49 New Statesman, February 3, 1923, p.506.

50 George Ward Price, Director Associated News Paper Ltd; educated Saint Catharine's College, Cambridge; Special Foreign Correspondent of the Daily Mail; War correspondent with Turkish Army in First Balkan War; Official War Correspondent at Dardanelles, and with Salonica Army; War Correspondent in France 1939; with 1st Army in Tunisia, and with Allied Armies in France, 1944. Publications: "The Story of the Salonica; Army", 1917; "With the Prince to West Africa", 1925; "Through South Africa With the Prince", 1926; "In Morocco With the Legion", 1934; "I Knew These Dictators", 1937; "Year of Reckoning", 1939. "Extra-Special Correspondent", 1957. He died in 1961. Who Was Who, vol.VI, 1961-1970, p.916.

51 Rauf Bey's connection with England was very intimate. His father served for two and half years as a lieutenant in H.M.S.Warrior. Rauf Bey himself had been ten times to England and spoke English extremely well.

Rauf Bey was in favour of peace, but warned the British that: "You can never govern the East by trying to dominate Turkey; but if we are your friends your difficulties will disappear". Ward Price reported that the Turks were demanding independence, but that, at the same time they did not want to obtain it at the cost of a humiliation for the Allies⁵².

Nine days later Ward Price had an interview with Mustafa Kemal, who defined the Turkish point of view as follows:

"Have you met anyone here who does not want peace? The difficulty seems to be, that the Western Powers persist in thinking that they are dealing with the old Ottoman Empire. They do not realise that a New Turkey has replaced the old, a Turkey different not only in the form of its Government, but also in its national spirit...She asks no more than the same measure of independence which European powers claim for themselves, but to achieve this she is ready to sacrifice her last man".

Ward Price alluded to the foreign loans, which would doubtless be necessary for the improvement and development of the new Turkey. Mustafa Kemal answered:

"...The Old Imperial Ottoman Government constantly made the fatal mistake of borrowing beyond its resources, and so gave foreign States the opportunity to establish that financial domination over Turkey, which has been so fatal to the country. It was in this way that the 'Ottoman Public Debt', an institutions that entrenches so deeply upon the financial independence of Turkey, came into being. We are determined to avoid such financial shackles in the future. We shall need the help of foreign capital and welcome it, but it must be on terms which completely safeguard our sovereignty within our dominions..."

Ward Price observed that the Turks sincerely believed that the Lausanne Peace Treaty was sown with traps for their feet, and that they thought Europe wanted a policy of "economic slavery of Turkey". He informed his readers:

"No one can meet this still young chief of state without feeling respect and admiration for his qualities. His strong will, his cool, objective brain, his level-headed sanity, and his modesty mark him out as one of the great men of his time. It will be a tragedy if the statesman of Europe fail to secure such a man and the people he leads as friends instead of enemies"⁵³.

Ward Price's theme of the "New Turkey" was taken up by other newspapers. The Times, with marked scepticism, criticized Turkish political standards, and stated "Turkey must choose which she is going to adopt...if they

⁵² Daily Mail, March 1, 1923, p.9.

⁵³ Over Seas Daily Mail, March 10, 1923, p.5.

really wanted to modernise their country they must adopt the obligations as well as the catch words of modern politics. Otherwise they will never become Europeanized".⁵⁴ Against this, the Manchester Guardian found the new Turks more reasonable than the old ones, and characterised Mustafa Kemal Pasha as a "democrat"⁵⁵. In the Daily Mail, Ward Price returned to his theme: a new Turkey had come into existence, with an intense national consciousness and a spirit of active patriotism, and the new Turkey was modernising itself as fast as its poverty would allow.⁵⁶ In a similar spirit, Lovat Fraser argued in the Sunday Pictorial that the Turks were a new nation, created by Lloyd George's wrong policy. Lovat Fraser condemned people like Lord Curzon, who were thinking of a Turkey of fifty years ago.⁵⁷ The Sunday Pictorial's proprietor Lord Rothermere⁵⁸ intervened to express concern about Great Britain's policy towards the Moslem world, and about business arrangements in Turkey. He suggested that the right policy was to "make peace with Turkey", and to convince the Moslem world that Britain was not hostile to Moslem interests⁵⁹. A leading article in the Weekly Dispatch was also in favour of peace with Turkey, and criticised Lloyd George's cabinet: "This country has already suffered enough by the blunders and follies of the late government". It was also concerned for British prestige: "As a Moslem Power, our prestige, it is to be feared, has not been enhanced"⁶⁰

54 The Times argued that the Turks had been in Europe but had never become Europeanized, July 14, 1923, p.11; July 10, 1923, p.15.

55 Manchester Guardian, March 10, 1923, p.

56 The Daily Mail complained that when Lord Curzon was Foreign Secretary British Policy was decided by the band of ardent young amateurs who dwelt in Mr. Lloyd George's back garden in Downing Street. March 1, 1923, p.8; March 22, 1923, p.8.

57 Sunday Pictorial, March 1, 1923, p.6.

58 Harold Sidney Harmsworth (first Viscount Rothermere), (1868-1940); newspaper proprietor; born Hampstead; St. Marylebone Grammar School; a clerk in the Inland Revenue Office; his brother Alfred asked him to join the firm which he had founded to produce a number of periodicals such as Answers, Comic Cuts, and the Sunday Companion; agreed and took in hand the business side of the organisation which developed into the Amalgamated Press; showed rare ability for financial management. They bought the Evening News and in 1896 launched the Daily Mail. In 1914 took over the Daily Mirror along with its satellite, the Sunday Pictorial (the first Sunday picture newspaper to appear in London); in 1910, created a baronet; four years later he was raised to the peerage as Baron Rothermere; accepted in 1916 the director-generalship of the Royal Army Clothing Department and in the following year was appointed Air Minister with the special task of amalgamating what were then the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps. After the war Rothermere took over control of Associated Newspapers, owning the Daily Mail, Evening News, and the Sunday Dispatch; this he kept until 1932. Rothermere signed frequent articles in the Daily Mail on the need for a strong Air Force and in praise of Mussolini and Hitler. Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, p.400-401.

59 Sunday Pictorial, April 22, 1923, p.7.

60 Weekly Dispatch, March 11, 1923, p.8; March 25, 1923, p.8. According to the Weekly Dispatch British Policy had harmed the great cotton industry in Lancashire. Not only was the important market in Asia Minor closed to British goods, but also British markets had suffered from a boycott by Mohammedans in other Muslim countries. See April 22, 1923, p.8; also see discussion about evacuation of Mesopotamia, George C. Buchanan, "Why Do We Remain in Mesopotamia", Nineteenth Century and After, vol.93, May 1923, p.764-766.

The socialist Daily Herald went further, complaining of Greek influence in Britain's Foreign Office⁶¹, and of "Business Haggling At Lausanne", "which will in the long run be provided, and paid for by the Anatolian peasantry, whose future will be bought and sold and haggled over at the bars and in the lounges of the Lausanne hotels during the next few weeks".⁶² The Daily Herald was also supportive of the Turks' insistence upon economic and financial independence. An article by Sir Ernest Nathaniel Bennet⁶³ argued that the Turks were not emulating the example of the Western nations, by seeking to put a ring fence round their resources. Their door was open to honest traders, but the Turk refused to be treated any longer as a kind of colonial dumping ground for European financiers: "the new spirit of Turkey is utterly weary and sick of this tutelage and tyranny; rather than go back to the old days of economic bondage they will fight to the last man". Bennet stated that British labour must say: "we will not tolerate a fresh war for the sake of British or foreign financiers"⁶⁴.

Writing in the Contemporary Review, however, A.J.Toynbee⁶⁵ warned that Turkey would soon have to come to terms with Western Europe, because without foreign loans she could not continue to finance her army. In that case her future would be similar to her recent past, and "she will sink

⁶¹ Daily Herald, March 9, 1923, p.3.

⁶² Daily Herald, April 12, 1923, p.3.

⁶³ Sir Ernest Nathaniel Bennet; educated Durham School; Hertford College, Oxford. He served as War Correspondent during Creten insurrection 1897, and with Soudan expedition, 1898; he joined Ottoman Army in Tripoli, 1911; Press Censor on Turkish staff in Thrace, Balkan War, 1912; Assistant Postmaster General 1932-1935. British Red Cross Commissioner in Belgium, France and Serbia, 1914-1915. He joined the Labour party 1916; Member of Parliament (Labour) central Cardiff, 1929-1931; and (Nat-Lab) 1931-1945. Publications: "The Downfall of the Dervishes"; "With the Turks in Tripoli"; "The German Army in Belgium"; he died in 1947. Who Was Who, 1941-1950, vol IV, p.88.

⁶⁴ Daily Herald, May 10, 1923, p.5.

⁶⁵ Arnold Joseph Toynbee, (1889-1975); author, scholar, and historian; born in London; gained a scholarship to Winchester College, and another from there to Balliol College, Oxford, in 1907; acquired a remarkable knowledge of Latin and Greek, obtaining first classes in both classical honours moderations (1909), and "Literae Humaniores" (1911); a tutor in ancient Greek and Roman history at Balliol; spent most of the war years in government work, notably in the Political Intelligence Department of Foreign Office; a member of the British delegation to the Paris peace conference of 1919; appointed to the Chair of Byzantine and Modern Greek language, literature, and history at London University; resigned in 1924; went to Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), as director of studies until 1946, writing of the annual Survey of International Affairs; Simultaneously he was research professor of international history in the University of London; during World War II director of the Foreign Office Research Department; retired from Chatham House and his chair in 1955; writer of many book; "Study of History" in twelve volumes was published by the Oxford University Press between 1934 and 1961; a regular contributor to the Manchester Guardian, and the Observer, and wrote a weekly column in the Economist between 1930 and 1939. Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, p.857-858. Also see more information S. Foina Mortan, A Biography of Arnold J. Toynbee, 1981.

again from being a player to being a pawn. It remains to be seen whether she will be an English pawn this time or a Russian one"⁶⁶.

Writing in the Nineteenth Century and After, A.Hulme Beaman⁶⁷ argued that: "At every turn in present foreign policy lie in ambush the hideous dragons of Bolshevism and Communism, which regard England as their only serious and deadly foe in the world. Can it be good business to throw Turkey into the arms of Russia or Germany, or both? The Turks have no love for Russia, but on the contrary, an ever-present fear. Yet we have repeatedly forced them to accept assistance and alliance from the Soviets. For whose sake? Certainly not our own"⁶⁸.

Winston S.Churchill pointed out in the Empire Review, "We must have a stable peace with Turkey... All our interprises and interests in the Middle East require a peace with Turkey. Without such a peace, increasing unrest and an increasing expense are inevitable... But an abject peace, based upon a confession of British impotence, and accompanied by lively demonstrations of alarm on our part, amid a chorus of humble expostulations, would undoubtedly ruin our reputation and our position, not only Middle East, but throughout the Orient as greatly as would an unsuccessful war". Winston Churchill criticized the popular press: "Our representatives at Lausanne have been cruelly hampered and weakened by repeated declarations in large portions of the British Press that no demands, however outrageous, that no provocation, however flagrant; no injuries, however grave, would in any circumstances be resented or resisted by Great Britain"⁶⁹.

In the event, negotiations at Lausanne resumed on 23 April 1923, and the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed on 24 July 1923, on terms which conceded many of Turkey's demands. In the treaty itself the most important clauses were those dealing with the new frontiers of Turkey, the redistribution of the Ottoman Public Debt, the abolition of the Capitulation system and

66 A.J.Toynbee, "The New Status of Turkey", Contemporary Review, vol.123, March 1923, p.289.

67 Arden George Hulme Beaman, (1857-1985); educated Bedford Grammar School; entered Consular Service as student interpreter; Acting Vice-Consul at Beyrout, Damascus, and Cairo; joined staff of Standard, 1883; resided as its correspondent in Egypt, Rumania, Bulgaria, Russia, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, as a war correspondent; joined the intelligence staff for employment with General Officer Commandary the forces in Egypt. Publications: "Life of Stamboloff"; "Twenty Years in the Near East". See Who Was Who, vol III, 1929-1940, p.81.

68 A.Hulme Beaman, "Lausanne and its Lessons", Nineteenth Century and After, March 1923, vol.93, p.326.

69 Winston Churchill argued that peace was essential to the satisfactory solution of all Britain's main problems throughout the Middle East. Also he noted that "Again and again in the House of Commons during the last three years, and on every Mesopotamian debate, I have dwelt on this". See Winston S. Churchill, "Mesopotamia and the New Government", Empire Review, vol.XXXVIII, no.270, July 1923, P.697-698.

the protection of minorities and exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece. Turkey got the whole of Eastern Thrace, while İstanbul was placed under the full sovereignty and administration of the Turkish government, with the right to maintain a Turkish garrison in the city. Safeguards with respect to the use of the Straits, both in time of war and in time of peace, were stipulated in a special Straits Convention annexed to the main Peace Treaty. The southern boundary of Turkey under the Lausanne treaty practically confirmed the boundary settlement stipulated in the Franco-Turkish Agreement in October 1921. The south-east boundary of Turkey including the question of Mosul, was left to be negotiated between Turkey and Great Britain: the two parties agreed to seek a settlement by direct discussion, with resort to the League of Nations in case no agreement was reached at the end of nine months. After the signature of the Treaty, the British Press became more understanding of Turkey, and began to consider more seriously the Ankara Government and its leader. The Observer warned that it was pointless to speak of "the unspeakable and the incurable Turk"⁷⁰. any more: Turkey had become more reasonable, and the leader of Turkey had become a peaceful administrator, who was leading the country from its primitive and undeveloped condition towards modern standards of national prosperity. In similarly positive tones, the Westminster Gazette noted that patience and realistic goodwill had achieved a peace between the Allies and Turkey at Lausanne: "Turkey obtains a definite place in Europe, and it was never Mr. Gladstone's 'bag and baggage' policy to turn her out of Constantinople, as some anti-Turks have so often contended". It believed that for the future Britain's main interest would be the freedom and security of trade in Turkey⁷¹.

Other newspapers, too, characterised the treaty as a kind of "Charter of Liberty", which recognised Turkey as an active and equal member of international society. The Manchester Guardian commented that the Turkish Government had got rid of the Sultan in internal affairs; thanks to the treaty, it had got rid of the Foreign Powers in external affairs⁷². The Over Seas Daily Mail declared that the Treaty began a new era in Britain's relations with the Turks: the Turks were now treated as an equal friend, a return to the old conservative policy of an amicable understanding with Turkey⁷³. The Economist preferred a policy of wait and see, but accepted that the result of the Lausanne conference was a Turkish victory, pointing out, however, that Turkey had not gained complete independence from the West, while the West itself had lost some prestige in Turkey.

⁷⁰ The Observer criticized other papers which were writing these kind of things during the Lausanne Negotiations, July 22, 1923, p.6

⁷¹ Westminster Gazette, July 10, 1923, p.6; the Westminster Gazette suggested that Turkey carry on her recognition of Western Civilisation, July 25, 1923, p.6.

⁷² Manchester Guardian, August 8, 1923, p.8.

⁷³ Over-Seas Daily Mail, July 28, 1923, p.12.

The Manchester Guardian and the Economist pointed out that the Lausanne Treaty was the first genuinely negotiated peace treaty to result from the First World War: the Turks had sat at the table on a footing of equality with the other Powers, and every article of the Treaty was debated and explained to the Turks, not by "brandishing the big stick"⁷⁴. The Times stated the Treaty opened a new chapter for Turkish history, and gave Turkey a position in the world which she had never held before, enhancing her respect among the other Muslim countries⁷⁵.

The Times, and the Near East, expressed mixed opinions. On the one hand, they agreed that the Turks had a right to become master of their own home, but both criticized the Turkish policy of complete independence, and the rejection of outside assistance. In addition, with the Greco-Turkish population exchange now agreed, they were concerned about the Christian minorities in Turkey. The Near East described Turkey's new policy as "the policy of hatred of the foreigner"⁷⁶. The Times thought that the ideal of most Turks was no doubt to get rid of minorities and European interference in all forms, and to live comfortably in their traditional way. But it warned that this kind of policy would mean disaster for Turkey: the Turks could do nothing without the Christian minorities, without foreign loans, and without the trust of the other powers. Almost every British newspaper questioned the Turkish policy of population exchange with Greece, believing that Turkey had thereby lost the most intelligent, and most industrious elements of the population. The question was asked several times: "how would the Turks replace the Greek and Armenian skills?"⁷⁷.

The signature of the Lausanne Treaty did alleviate British suspicions of Bolshevik influence on the Turkish government. Before and during the Lausanne negotiations, most papers believed as a matter of fact that the Turkish Government was thoroughly Bolshevik in its interpretation of international agreements, but the Daily Express stated that the Lausanne Treaty showed Turkey not to recognise any decisions which were not in its favour⁷⁸. The Times's Near East correspondent observed that Turkish relation with Russia were no longer so cordial as they had been: "there is a certain school of thought which would like Turkey, resigning herself to virtual territorial exclusion from Europe, to seek her expansion almost entirely in Asia and particularly towards the Caucasus. Such a policy would sooner or later bring her into conflict with Russia, and she would therefore like to have a friendly England on her South"⁷⁹.

⁷⁴ Economist, October 13, 1923, p.548; Manchester Guardian, July 28, 1923, p.10.

⁷⁵ Times, September 5, 1923, p.9.

⁷⁶ Near East gave the example of the Japan: "...if they were capable of studying the pages of history, they would discover that they could learn much from the lesson of the Far East...", July 26, 1923, p.9

⁷⁷ Times, July 18, 1923, p.13; August 17, 1923, p.9; August 27, 1923, p.11.

⁷⁸ Daily Express, July 30, 1923, p.8

⁷⁹ Times, August 27, 1923, p.11.

This view was partially echoed by J.A.Toynbee, in an article in the Nineteenth Century and After, entitled "Angora And The British Empire In The East"⁸⁰. Toynbee argued that "The Turks have not been looking to Russia for anything but munitions, diplomatic support and gold,...The Turks aim to become a member of the Western community of nations, not the Third International, and Turkey has turned her face to the West..."

In the months following the Lausanne treaty most British papers and periodicals continued to speculate about the future of Turkish economic policy, and the prospects for British trade and investment in Turkey. Like other Conservative papers, the Morning Post was of the opinion that the new Ankara regime put politics very much above economics⁸¹, and did not want to see any more foreigners work to their own financial detriment⁸². The Morning Post noted that the Turks were authorising foreign capital, foreign schools, and foreign entrepreneurs, but stressed that the new Turkish attitude towards foreign capital and enterprises was shaped by a "new nationalist spirit"⁸³. The Times was concerned about British businesses in Turkey, suggesting that the "Turks must learn to walk before they can run, it may take some time". The Times repeated the common belief that the Turks were quite incapable of any business capacity, thought the current Turkish xenophobia would eventually die, and that Turkey would see reality and give assurances to foreign investment⁸⁴. Writing in the Quarterly Review William Miller⁸⁵ agreed with this view of the Turkish character, and pointed out that⁸⁶ the Turks were good fighters but poor administrators, and that there was no differences between the "old", and the "new" Turks. The Manchester Guardian quoted Lord Curzon, who alluded to the economic provisions of the Lausanne Treaty in a speech at an Imperial Conference in Oc-

80 Nineteenth Century and After, vol.123, June 1923, p.688.

81 In the Economist a recent visitor to Turkey stated that: "the Turks are at present more interested in economics than in politics. Two years ago questions of frontiers were absorbing their attention." see May 12, 1923, p.981.

82 Morning Post, January 3, 1924, p.7.

83 Morning Post, January 4, 1924, p.5.

84 Times, November 28, 1923, p.11.

85 William Miller, (1864-1945); historian and journalist; born at Wigton, Cumberland; educated at Rugby and, as a scholar, at Hertford College, Oxford; awarded a first class in classical moderations (1884), and in "literae humaniores" (1887); made frequency journeys to the Balkan Peninsula, particularly to Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro; became known as an authority on Balkan affairs; first signed historical article, a review of recent books on Montenegrin history, appeared in the English Historical Review in July 1896; reviews and articles appeared in all the important historical journals in Britain; contributed regularly to the American Historical Review, and to several learned periodicals in Greece; From 1903 to 1937 correspondent of the Morning Post for Italy and the Balkans; Among Miller's main works are; "The Latins in the Levant", 1908; "The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913"; "The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801-1934"; "The Balkans, 1896"; "Travel and Politics in the Near East", 1898; History of the Greek People, 1821,1921". Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-1950, p.593-594.

86 William Miller, "The Return of the Turks", Quarterly Review, vol.242, no.481, October 1924.

tober 1923⁸⁷, warning that the chief sufferer would not be the foreign community but Turkey herself: "I think that she will experience great disillusionment and many disappointments, and some of the fruits which she claims to have garnered will turn out to be Dead Sea apples in her mouth. But in making what will be a great experiment she starts with a complete absence of resentment on our part and with the sincere expression of our goodwill".

Although the Times was not sure whether Turkey's economic policy would change, abandoning xenophobia and encouraging the return of foreign enterprise and foreign capital ⁸⁸. The Times and the Daily Telegraph were both worried about the Ottoman debt, and thought that Turkey aimed at a veiled repudiation of the debt ⁸⁹. At Lausanne, Turkey had agreed to pay the Ottoman debt, but some argument was going on between the Turkish Government and France about the payment. Moreover both papers were concerned about the elimination of Christian minorities from all services in Turkey ⁹⁰.

Nevertheless the Times ⁹¹ was in favour of establishing close and friendly relations with Turkey. But the Spectator commented on Turkey's investment position, and found that it was not suitable for the investment of British capital ⁹².

The British press did not really believe that Turkey was capable of economic reconstruction without borrowing fresh capital and technique from the West.⁹³ Although, writing in Foreign Affairs, A.J.Toynbee ⁹⁴ was not sure whether Turkey would accept foreign assistance or not, he noted that Turkey had become a devotee of the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, which was also an original Western idea. Toynbee thought that Turkey appeared to be sacrificing her economic recovery to her political principles, but he believed that the new Turkey was not "dazzled" by her recent military success.

⁸⁷ Manchester Guardian, October 6, 1923, p.10.

⁸⁸ Times, April 14, 1924, p.11.

⁸⁹ Daily Telegraph, April 30, 1924, p.12.

⁹⁰ The Daily Telegraph was worried by the decision of Angora Government that "...in future all Turkish subjects are to be classified as Turks..." February 23, 1924, p.9.

⁹¹ Times, December 22, 1924, p.11

⁹² Spectator, February 2, 1924, p.151

⁹³ During that period Mr. McDonald went to Turkey and found British interests were in danger of suffering under the new regime. See Manchester Guardian, November 3, 1923, p.12.

⁹⁴ A.J.Toynbee, "The East After Lausanne", Foreign Affairs, vol.2, no.1, September 15, 1923, p.95-98

Conclusion

Both elite and popular opinion showed the greatest level of interest in Turkey, especially a period of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic and military confrontation. The Lausanne negotiations led the British press to take a closer look at Turkey's organisation and leadership, and to attempt to give a picture of new Turkey to the British press.

During the Lausanne negotiations, most of the British press agreed that the Turks did not want peace, and the press led the British people to believe that: "the Turks mean to fight", they were "bellicose", "under Bolshevik influence", "the new Turk was same as the old Turk", "playing off one power against the other", "the Turks did not understand the modern diplomacy". This view that the new Turks were anti-European, and extreme nationalists, was particularly stressed by the conservative newspapers.

On the other hand, some of the popular press held that Turkey had the right, which could not injure other nations, to full administrative, economic and financial independence, and that recognition of this right would suffice to ensure peace. Gradually, as the Lausanne negotiations drew towards a conclusion, the conservative papers changed their view, and become more optimistic about the chances of peace, presenting Mustafa Kemal and his friends as rather moderate politicians, who sought no more than peace, and the establishment of their new independence.

During the Lausanne negotiations and after, the conservative press continued to express concern about the new Turkish leaders' alleged involvement with Russian Bolsheviks, and to suspect that the Turkish government was under Bolshevik influence. Anti-communist feeling was so widely spread in Britain that the conservative newspapers certainly wanted no part of communism. But after a few years the conservative newspapers lost their concern, concluding that the new Turkey would not become communist, and that it was clear that Turkey's aspirations were directed towards the West, not the East.

The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 had set the seal of international recognition upon Turkey's victories, but down to 1927 the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Turkish Republic remained strained. With the successful resolution of the Mosul dispute in 1926, however, Anglo-Turkish relations entered a phase of slow but steady improvement, and, the tone of

British press comment also began to change for the better. Gradually, the British press came to regard the Turkish Republic as a peaceful state, without aggressive foreign ambitions, the corner-stone of whose foreign policy was "peace at home and peace in the world", as Mustafa Kemal himself expressed it. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that by 1938, the year of Mustafa Kemal's death, the British press had come to regard the new Turkey as a pillar of international peace and stability.